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We demonstrate the existence of periodic nonstationary equilibria with self-generating cycles in a simple model of
random search. Our results provide a theory of synchronized sales based on product market search by heterogeneous
consumers. That is, our model explains how it can be optimal for all sellers to follow a repeated pattern of posting a
high price for several periods and then posting a low price for one period.
1. INTRODUCTION
In this article, we demonstrate the existence of periodic nonstationary equilibria with self-
generating cycles in a simple model of random sequential search. Although existence of equi-
librium cross-sectional price dispersion is a well-understood feature of this class of model, the
possibility of dispersion across dates—in the sense of recurring price cycles—has hardly been
explored. We show that the periodic nonstationary equilibrium is dynamically stable whereas
the corresponding stationary dispersion equilibrium is dynamically unstable. Our results of-
fer a simple theory of synchronized sales based on product market search by heterogeneous
consumers.2 That is, our model explains how it can be optimal for sellers to follow a repeated
pattern of posting a high price for several periods and then posting a low price for one period.
We consider a market in which consumers search for an acceptable price for a single unit
of a semidurable good. We use shoes as an example, although our theory would apply equally
well (perhaps up to some minor formal changes) to cars, houses, domestic appliances, etc. Our
model could also apply to the labor market, although this would require a more substantial
reinterpretation. As is standard in random search models, consumers know the distribution of
prices across sellers but not the price charged by any particular seller, so it may take time for a
consumer to find a new pair of shoes at an acceptable price. The framework we use is based on
the Diamond (1987) model of consumer search, which in turn is closely related to the Albrecht
and Axell (1984) job search model.3 In Albrecht and Axell (1984), there are two worker types
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typically are not synchronized across sellers. See, for example, Pesendorfer (2002) on sales of ketchup products in
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(1987).
with different values of leisure, which in turn leads to reservation wage heterogeneity. Similarly,
in Diamond (1987), there are two consumer types, who get different utility from consuming the
good. With the shoe market in mind, we call the two consumer types fashionistas and sensible
shoppers. Fashionistas are assumed to receive higher utility from consuming the good (wearing
their shoes) than sensible shoppers do. In addition—and in a departure fromDiamond (1987)—
we assume that the fashionistas’ shoes depreciate or go out of style faster than do the shoes
of the sensible shoppers. Once their shoes become unfashionable or wear out, consumers are
assumed to receive no utility from wearing their old shoes. There is nothing essential about
assuming that the two consumer types differ along two dimensions, as opposed to only one—
this simply allows us to make our point with less algebra. When a consumer’s shoes wear out
(or go out of style), the consumer returns to the shopper pool. In the basic model we assume for
simplicity that every shopper finds one and only one pair of shoes that she likes in each period,
an assumption that we relax in our robustness analysis.
Our model has both stationary and nonstationary equilibria. There is a unique stationary
equilibrium for each parameter configuration. For some parameter values—essentially, when
the sensible shoppers are not worth bothering with—only a high price, which is equal to the
fashionistas’ reservation price, is posted.Alternatively, when the sensible shoppers are relatively
many and/or they are not so different from the fashionistas, only a low price, which is equal
to the sensible shoppers’ reservation price, is posted. Finally, there is an intermediate set of
parameters that are consistent with stationary equilibrium price dispersion; that is, some sellers
post a high price that is acceptable only to the fashionistas whereas the others post a low price
that is acceptable to both consumer types. These stationary equilibrium results are well known
in the equilibrium search literature.However, the idea that there can be nonstationary equilibria
in this type of model is new.
We consider periodic nonstationary equilibria in which all sellers post high prices (accept-
able only to fashionistas) for Th periods followed by T periods in which all sellers post low
prices (acceptable to both consumer types). Our results are as follows. First, a unique periodic
equilibrium exists for every parameter combination that leads to stationary equilibrium price
dispersion. Second, depending on parameter values, these equilibria are such that Th = 1, 2,
3, . . . , but always have T = 1. That is, the equilibrium pattern is one in which sellers post a high
price for Th periods followed by a single period in which all sellers post the low price. Third, the
value of Th in a periodic equilibrium is uniquely determined by the parameters of the model.
In particular, for those parameter combinations that are consistent with stationary equilibrium
price dispersion in which relatively few sellers post the fashionistas’ reservation price, the peri-
odic equilibrium is one in which all sellers post a high price for one period, followed by the low
price, followed by the high price, etc. If the stationary dispersion equilibrium is one in which
sufficiently more sellers post the high price, then the periodic equilibrium is one with Th = 2
(and T = 1). Indeed, there are parameter combinations consistent with a periodic equilibrium
in which sellers post high prices for all possible Th followed by a single period in which the low
price is posted. The higher is Th, the higher is the fraction of sellers who offer the high price
in the corresponding stationary dispersion equilibrium. Fourth, as noted earlier, we show that
the unique periodic nonstationary equilibrium is dynamically stable whereas the corresponding
unique dispersion stationary equilibrium is dynamically unstable. Finally, we check robustness
by relaxing the assumption that shoppers sample a pair of shoes with probability 1 in each pe-
riod. In this version of the model, we continue to find unique periodic nonstationary equilibria
with Th = 1, 2, 3, . . . and T = 1, but we also find different cyclical equilibria for some other
parameter combinations.
The mechanism that lies behind our nonstationary equilibria is straightforward. Demand
from sensible shoppers accumulates during high-price periods. At some point, which depends
on the strength of the sensible shoppers’ demand and on how quickly they accumulate in the
pool of shoppers, it makes sense to “hold a sale” to exploit the pent-up demand. Once that
demand is satisfied, sellers revert to the high-price regime. The periodic equilibria in our model
are thus self generating. The high- and low-price phases lead to compositional changes in the
pool of shoppers that naturally drive the cycles. In this sense, the nonstationary equilibria in
our model differ from the cycles featured in equilibrium search models such as Diamond and
Fudenberg (1989), Fershtman and Fishman (1992), and Burdett and Coles (1998). These are
models with multiple stationary equilibria in which agents’ beliefs determine which equilibrium
obtains. Nonstationary equilibria can be supported if agents believe that the economy will first
move toward one stationary equilibrium and then toward another in alternating phases. Our
nonstationary equilibria are different. At any parameter configuration that is consistent with
a periodic nonstationary equilibrium in our model, there is one and only one corresponding
stationary equilibrium.
As we mentioned earlier, our model offers a simple and compelling theory of synchronized
sales. Sellers post high prices for several periods and then “hold a sale” by posting a low price for
a single period. Depending on parameters, these sales can occur at different intervals—weekly,
monthly, quarterly, etc. Sales are, of course, worth studying in their own right, but they also
play an important role in empirical macroeconomics. First, sales are important for price indices.
Just as price indices need to account for the fact that consumers can substitute across different
goods, so too do price indices need to account for the fact that consumers can substitute across
the same good at different points in time (Feenstra and Shapiro, 2003). Second, there is an
extensive empirical literature on price flexibility (e.g., Klenow andMalin, 2011)—how often are
prices adjusted and by how much? To address these questions, researchers need to understand
transitory price changes due to sales.
There is a literature that interprets synchronized sales as intertemporal price discrimination.
Conlisk et al. (1984) consider a monopolist who faces a new cohort of consumers entering the
market in each period, some with a low valuation and some with a high valuation. Consumers
stay in the market until they make a purchase; after buying, they exit. In this setting it is optimal
for the monopolist to charge prices that only the high-valuation consumers will accept for
several periods before setting a low price for one period to take advantage of the buildup of the
low-valuation consumers. Sobel (1984) extends this result to an oligopolistic framework and,
using punishment strategies, shows that there can be synchronized sales, i.e., an equilibrium in
which all sellers periodically cut their prices to the same level for one period. Dutta et al. (2007)
derive a related result in an overlapping generations framework. Relative to this literature, our
contribution is to show how search frictions can generate synchronized sales as an equilibrium
outcome in a competitive environment with a continuum of firms. Papers such as Conlisk et al.
(1984) show that repeated entry of new consumers allows a monopolist (or oligopolists in the
case of Sobel, 1984, and Dutta et al., 2007) to sustain above-marginal-cost pricing in a market
for a durable good by engaging in intertemporal price discrimination, thus getting around the
Coase (1972) conjecture. As in these papers, our baseline model has an influx of new shoppers
every period since fashionistas always want to buy a new pair of shoes. More fundamentally,
the Coase conjecture is based on competition between the price that a seller posts today and
the prices that the seller will post in the future. With random search and a continuum of sellers,
such competition is not possible. Indeed, if the buyer rejects the seller’s offer, then the buyer
and seller do not expect to meet again. In the oligopoly framework, there are generally multiple
equilibria, and punishment strategies are required to sustain synchronized sales. In our model,
there is a unique stable equilibrium—stationarywith a single price for someparameters, periodic
for other parameter configurations. By avoiding multiplicity, our structure thus gives a more
tractable and compelling explanation of synchronized sales.4
4 There is, of course, also a substantial literature that attempts to explain nonsynchronized sales. Some early papers in
the equilibrium search literature, e.g., Varian (1980), interpret equilibrium price dispersion as a theory of sales. Other
authors, e.g., Slade (1998) and Aguirregabiria (1999), model sales as a response to inventory accumulation. A related
strand of the literature (e.g., Lazear, 1986) focuses on clearance sales, i.e., price reductions to clear out inventories
before a new product is introduced. Finally, there are papers that model sales as a way to build a customer base. For
example, in Nakamura and Steinsson (2011), when a firm has a sale it is offering a low price to attract new customers,
who then “get in the habit” of buying from that firm. Similarly, in Shi (2011), firms hold sales to attract buyers and build
customer relationships. His paper is related to ours in the sense that he also uses an equilibrium search model, albeit
The outline of the rest of the article is as follows. In the next section, we give the basics of
our model. In Section 3, we present the stationary equilibria, and in Section 4 we analyze the
nonstationary, periodic equilibria. In Section 5, we generalize ourmodel to check the robustness
of our results. Section 6 concludes.
2. THE BASIC MODEL
2.1. Environment. Consider themarket for a consumption good that is semidurable (shoes)
in the sense that it does not necessarily fully depreciate each period. We assume that time is
discrete, indexed by t, and that all agents are infinitely lived and discount the future at rate β <
1 per period.5 Agents either buy and wear shoes or run a shoe store. By wearing a pair of shoes,
a consumer enjoys a constant utility of vk > 0 each period, where k = 0, 1 is the consumer’s
type (to be defined momentarily), until the shoes go out of fashion (or wear out), which occurs
with constant probability δk per period. Once her shoes go out of fashion (or wear out), the
consumer no longer enjoys wearing them (her utility per period falls to 0) and goes shopping
for a new pair.
Shopping is modeled as a search process—the market for shoes is affected by search frictions
in that every shopper finds one and only one pair of shoes that she likes in each shopping period.
However, the consumer may or may not buy the shoes—that depends on the price. Shoe prices
are posted by the shoe stores and cannot be bargained over. The consumer decides whether to
buy the shoes or to continue shopping next period.
There are two consumer types. Type-1 consumers (fashionistas) enjoy a high utility, v1, which
we normalize to 1, in each period that they wear shoes, whereas type-0 consumers (sensible
shoppers) only enjoy v0 ≡ v, where 0 < v < 1. The two types also differ in terms of how quickly
their shoes depreciate or go out of style. In particular, fashionistas’ shoes go out of style each
period with probability δ1 = 1 whereas sensible shoppers’ shoes depreciate each period with
probability δ0 = δ < 1. The normalization δ1 = 1 is not without loss of generality, but one can
think of a period as the time it takes for the fashionistas’ shoes to go out of style.6 The total
population of consumers is normalized to 1, and the share of fashionistas in the population
is λ.
2.2. Values and Prices. Stores post prices and shoppers arbitrage between buying shoes and
holding a nume´raire good of which they receive a fixed endowment each period and fromwhich
they derive a utility that is normalized to 0. Because there are only two consumer types, each
with a different reservation price, shoe stores choose to post either a high price, which is equal
to the reservation price of fashionistas and which sensible shoppers would turn down, or a low
price equal to the reservation price of sensible shoppers, which both consumer types would
accept. Let γt denote the fraction of stores posting the high price in period t.
with directed instead of random search. The underlying mechanisms in our model (intertemporal price discrimination)
and his (building a customer base) are, however, quite different.
5 Discrete time seems like the natural modeling choice for high-frequency phenomena such as sales and indeed is the
assumption used in the sales literature discussed above. The assumption that time is discrete is not, however, without
loss of generality. The technical benefit of discrete time is that it allows us to formalize our theory of synchronized
sales as a simple scalar (one-dimensional), autonomous dynamic system. It is well known that, in continuous time, one-
dimensional autonomous dynamic systems cannot exhibit periodic behavior, whereas one-dimensional autonomous
discrete-time systems can. Periodic behavior in continuous time can be achieved in our model by introducing a second
state variable but does not, in our opinion, add anything in terms of insight. A sketch of our model in continuous time
can be found on our web pages.
6 What this normalizationdoes for us is reduce thedimensionality of thedynamic system that characterizes ourmodel’s
equilibrium by ensuring that the fashionistas’ reservation price is always equal to one—see Equation (5) later. With
δ1 < 1, the fashionistas’ reservation price would have nontrivial, forward-looking dynamics and add a (nonpredeter-
mined) state variable to the model. The resulting two-dimensional model would be algebraically considerably more
cumbersome without adding much economic insight.
For a type-k consumer we denote the lifetime value of shopping in period t by Skt and that of
wearing shoes by Wkt . The net value of buying shoes at price pt is W
k
t − pt, so the reservation
price rkt of a type-k consumer is defined byW
k
t − rkt = βSkt+1.
We now turn to formal definitions of the value functions. Starting with the value of wearing
shoes for sensible shoppers,
W0t = v + β
{
(1 − δ)W0t+1 + δS0t+1
}
.(1)
The first term is the current-period utility. At the end of the period, the shoes remain wearable
with probability (1 − δ), in which case the consumer continues without shopping, whereas with
probability δ the shoes wear out and the individual becomes a shopper. The corresponding value
of being a (sensible) shopper is
S0t = γtβS0t+1 + (1 − γt)
(
W0t − r0t
)
= βS0t+1.
(2)
In the current period, the shopper receives noutility.With probability γt, the shopper encounters
a store with a high price and continues as a shopper into the next period. With probability 1 −
γt, she finds shoes at an acceptable price and purchases shoes, which generate value W0t − r0t ,
the lifetime value of wearing the shoes less the price. Value function (2) implies for all t that
S0t = 0.(3)
Then, value function (1) implies for all t that
r0t = W0t =
v
1 − β(1 − δ) ≡ r
0.(4)
Next consider the fashionistas. Their lifetime value of wearing shoes is
W1t = 1 + βS1t+1,(5)
reflecting our assumption that a fashionista’s shoes go out of style with probability 1 at the end
of the current period. This implies that the fashionistas’ reservation price is the same for all t,
namely,
r1t = 1 ≡ r1.(6)
The lifetime value of shopping for these consumers is
S1t = γt
(
W1t − r1
)+ (1 − γt)(W1t − r0)
= βS1t+1 + (1 − γt)(r1 − r0).
(7)
As was the case for the sensible shoppers, fashionistas receive no utility while searching for a
new pair of shoes. With probability γt, they encounter a store posting the high price, purchase
the shoes, and receive the value of wearing new shoes less the high price. With probability
1 − γt, they find the shoes at a store posting the low price and receive the value of wearing new
shoes less the low price. The condition that ensures that fashionistas are willing to spend more
than sensible shoppers are to buy shoes is simply r1 = 1 > r0; that is,
v < 1 − β(1 − δ).(8)
If this restriction does not hold, then the roles of the fashionistas and sensible shoppers are
reversed.
2.3. Consumer Stocks. Let st denote the share of shoppers in the total consumer population
and ϕt the share of fashionistas among the shoppers at the beginning of period t. These shares
depend on the history of stores’ pricing strategies. However, fashionistas never resist buying
shoes and therefore always leave the population of shoppers with probability 1 at the end of
each period no matter what fraction of stores post the high price. The stock of fashionistas who
are shopping is thus constant at their population share, so
stϕt ≡ λ.(9)
The total number of shoppers then evolves according to
st+1 = st − stϕt − (1 − γt)st(1 − ϕt) + λ + δ(1 − λ − st(1 − ϕt)γt)
= λ + (1 − λ)δ + γtst(1 − δ) − λγt(1 − δ),
(10)
where the second equality uses (9). The number of shoppers at the beginning of period t + 1
equals the number at the start of period t minus the stϕt fashionistas who all buy shoes minus
the (1 − γt)st(1 − ϕt) sensible shoppers who encountered stores posting the low price plus all
the λ fashionistas whose shoes went out of fashion at the end of the period plus the δ(1 − λ −
st(1− ϕt)γt) sensible shoppers who enjoyed their shoes during the period but whose shoes wore
out at the end of the period.
2.4. Stores’ Decisions. Stores seek to maximize expected sales revenue each period.7 This is
proportional to the probability that the posted price will be accepted by a randomlymet shopper
times the sale price—thewholesale price atwhich shoe stores buy their stock is assumed constant
and is normalized to 0. Hence a store chooses to post the high price r1, at which only fashionistas
are prepared to buy, instead of the low price r0, which is acceptable to all consumers, if and only
if r1ϕt > r0. Of course, they make the converse choice (are indifferent between the two options)
if and only if this latter inequality holds in reverse (becomes an equality). By using (6) and (9),
one can rewrite the conditions under which stores post the high price, both prices, or the low
price as
γt = 1 if st < λr0
γt ∈ (0, 1) if st = λr0
γt = 0 if st > λr0 .
(11)
Note that any individual store’s decision rule only depends on the beginning-of-period stock
of shoppers and is independent of the current period choices made by competing firms. In other
words, there is no within-period strategic interaction among stores in this market. Moreover, it
is clear from (11), which only depends on the aggregate state variable st, that whatever choice
is optimal for one store in a given period is optimal for all stores in that period. Therefore,
7 This assumes that finding a good deal at a particular store does not lead a consumer to return to the same store
again after her shoes have depreciated. In equilibrium, this assumption is sensible—there is no reason for a consumer
to patronize the same store more than once. It is also worth noting that the assumption that sellers maximize expected
current period revenue distinguishes our model, which is set in a product market, from labor market models like
Albrecht and Axell (1984) and Gaumont et al. (2006). In a labor market, the relationship between the buyer (the firm)
and the seller (the worker) extends beyond the current period.
unless stores are indifferent between posting the high or the low price (i.e., unless st = λ/r0),
they either all post the high price (γt = 1) or they all post the low price (γt = 0), and there is no
within-period price dispersion in equilibrium. Substituting the decision rule (11) into the law
of motion (10) thus yields a slightly more compact expression for the law of motion of st in the
form of a piecewise linear difference equation:
st+1 = F (st) :=
⎧⎪⎨
⎪⎩
st(1 − δ) + δ if st < λr0
δ + λ(1 − δ) if st > λr0 .
(12)
3. STATIONARY EQUILIBRIA
In this section, we investigate the existence and properties of stationary long-run equilibria
in which all endogenous variables remain constant over time.
3.1. Stationary Equilibrium with γ = 1 (All Stores Post the High Price). Equation (12) im-
plies that if such a stationary equilibrium exists, it features a constant number of shoppers s∗h
given by
s∗h = 1.(13)
Condition (11) further implies that it is indeed optimal for stores to post the high price in this
situation if and only if
s∗h = 1 <
λ
r0
.(14)
3.2. Stationary Equilibrium with γ = 0 (All Stores Post the Low Price). Following similar
steps, if such a stationary equilibrium exists, the number of shoppers s∗ is given by
s∗ = λ + (1 − λ)δ,(15)
and the consistency condition (11) for this to be an equilibrium is
s∗ = λ + (1 − λ)δ >
λ
r0
.(16)
3.3. Stationary Equilibrium with γ ∈ (0, 1) (Price Dispersion). If a stationary equilibrium
with price dispersion exists, the number of shoppers s∗γ is found using (10) and is given by
s∗γ =
λ + (1 − λ)δ − λγ(1 − δ)
1 − γ(1 − δ) .(17)
For this to be an equilibrium, (11) must hold as an equality. Substituting the above expression
for s∗γ , this condition becomes
s∗γ =
λ + (1 − λ) δ − λγ(1 − δ)
1 − γ(1 − δ) =
λ
r0
.(18)
This defines a unique share of firms γ∗ ∈ (0, 1) if and only if
λ + δ (1 − λ) < λ
r0
< 1.(19)
To see that γ∗ is indeed unique, note that the function γ → λ+(1−λ)δ−λγ(1−δ)1−γ(1−δ) increases monotoni-
cally from λ + δ(1 − λ) to 1 as γ increases from 0 to 1. Condition (19) defines a nonempty set of
parameter values for which stationary equilibria with price dispersion exist. Inspection of (18)
further reveals that γ∗, the equilibrium share of stores posting the high price, is a decreasing
function of r0 and an increasing function of λ. Posting the high price is more likely to be prof-
itable if there are more fashionistas around or if sensible shoppers are relatively less eager to
buy shoes.
3.4. Example. Let β = 11+0.012 = 0.988, so we think of a period as one quarter, and let λ =
δ = 0.5. Then, from (19) , 0.253 < v < 0.337 is consistent with equilibrium price dispersion. If,
for example, v = 0.3, then (from Equation (18)) a fraction γ∗ = 0.544 of the sellers post the
fashionista reservation price (r1 = 1). The other sellers post the sensible shopper reservation
price, r0 = 0.593 (from Equation (4)). If v < 0.253, then only the high price is posted, whereas if
v > 0.337, only the reservation price of the sensible shoppers, which is increasing in v up to the
point that inequality (8) binds (when v = 0.506 for this example), is posted.8
3.5. Stationary Equilibria: Summary and Stability Properties. Conditions (14), (16), and (19)
define the pattern of stationary equilibria. These conditions partition the parameter space, so a
unique stationary equilibrium always exists. This equilibrium only features price dispersion (in
the form of a two-point distribution) when condition (19) holds. Other stationary equilibria are
single-price. This is essentially the result presented in inequality (5) of Diamond (1987) and in
Proposition 1 of Gaumont et al. (2006).
Before we move on, we remark on the stability properties of the various stationary equilibria
listed in this section. First, both the high-price stationary equilibrium s∗h and the low price
stationary equilibrium s∗ , whenever they exist, are clearly globally stable, as the top and bottom
equations in (12), taken separately, each have slope in [0, 1) and therefore generate stable
dynamics. However, whenever parameters are such that (19) holds, then the only stationary
equilibrium is the one with price dispersion, s∗γ = λ/r0. Anticipating results in the next two
sections, we show below that the stationary equilibrium with price dispersion is dynamically
unstable. Aside fromour interest in offering a theory of sales, instability of the unique stationary
equilibrium in itself constitutes a motive to look for nonstationary stable long-run equilibria.
4. NONSTATIONARY EQUILIBRIA
The existence of stationary equilibria with price dispersion in this type ofmodel is well known.
What has not been shown before is that these equilibria coexist with nonstationary equilibria.
We now investigate the existence of such equilibria.
4.1. A Simple Example. The simplest example of a nonstationary equilibrium is a periodic
one in which all stores post the high price in even periods and the low price in odd periods (or
vice versa), i.e., γ2k = 1 and γ2k+1 = 0. We now investigate the conditions under which such
equilibria with periodicity 2 exist.
8 Note that there is nothing “special” about this example in the sense that for any (β, δ, λ) ∈ (0, 1)3, there is an interval
of v’s, i.e., sensible shopper period utilities, in (0, 1) that are consistent with stationary equilibrium price dispersion.
Let sh (s) denote the number of shoppers at the beginning of a period in which γ = 1 (γ =
0). Equation (12) implies
{
sh = λ + (1 − λ)δ
s = (1 − δ)sh + δ = (1 − δ)(λ + (1 − λ)δ) + δ.
(20)
Our candidate nonstationary equilibrium has the economy alternating between one period in
which the number of shoppers takes on the value sh and one period featuring s. For it to be a
valid equilibrium, the stores’ optimality condition (11) must be satisfied in both types of period;
i.e.,
s >
λ
r0
and sh <
λ
r0
must hold simultaneously. Substituting for sh and s, these conditions imply the following
restriction on the parameters:
λ + (1 − λ) δ < λ
r0
< (1 − δ) (λ + (1 − λ) δ) + δ.(21)
This restriction defines a nonempty set of parameter values. This type of nonstationary equi-
librium only coexists with stationary equilibria of the γ ∈ (0, 1) type, i.e., stationary equilibria
featuring price dispersion. More precisely, the minimum value of λ/r0 that is consistent with
stationary price dispersion is the same as theminimum λ/r0 that is consistent with an equilibrium
with periodicity 2, whereas the maximum λ/r0 that is consistent with stationary price dispersion
is greater than the maximum λ/r0 that is consistent with an equilibrium with periodicity 2. That
is, the lower bound of (21) equals the lower bound of (19), whereas the upper bound of (21) is
below the upper bound of (19).
The intuition underlying the periodic nonstationary equilibrium is straightforward. If only
the high price is posted in period t, then the sensible shoppers will delay replacing their shoes.
This changes the composition of the pool of shoppers moving into period t + 1; in particular,
the fraction of fashionistas in the shopper pool falls between t and t + 1 (ϕt+1 < ϕt). In period
t + 1, firms react to the increased presence of sensible shoppers by posting the lower price, etc.
4.2. A Theory of Synchronized Sales. Our simple example shows that an equilibrium with
self-generating cycles exists, but this example is limited as a theory of synchronized sales. A
theory of synchronized sales should allow for richer nonstationary periodic equilibria in which
the market spends Th periods in a high-price regime (γ = 1) and then spends one period in
a low-price regime (γ = 0). Equilibria of this type explain synchronized sales more generally,
e.g., weekly, monthly, or quarterly sales. We start with a more general setup and consider the
possibility of equilibria with T periods in a low-price regime (γ = 0) followed by Th periods
(γ = 1) in a high-price regime, with Th and T left unrestricted for now.We show that equilibria
exist in which Th takes on values greater than 1 but that no equilibria exist with T > 1. Thus,
we indeed have a theory of periodic synchronized price reductions instead of one of cycles with
several low-price periods followed by high-price periods. We also show that (Th, 1) equilibria
exist for all positive integer Th = 1, 2, 3, . . . . Furthermore, there is a (Th, 1) equilibrium for each
λ/r0 satisfying (19). These equilibria are ordered in the sense that the higher is the fraction of
firms, γ, that would post the high price in the stationary dispersion equilibrium (equivalently,
the higher is λ/r0), the higher is Th. The length of the interval of λ/r0’s consistent with a (Th,
1) equilibrium decreases with Th, and as Th → ∞, the value of λ/r0 consistent with periodic
equilibria collapses to 1, the upper limit of the interval given by (19).
Now we turn to the analysis. Because we are interested in periodic equilibria, it is convenient
to reset the time subscript t to zero every time the economy switches regimes. Moreover,
in what follows we add an {h, } superscript to the endogenous variable s to indicate the
economy’s current regime (high- or low-price, γ = 1 or 0 ). With these notational conventions,
characterization of the economy’s dynamic behavior follows from Equation (12).
4.2.1. The high- and low-price regimes. The law of motion (12) implies that, in the high-
price regime, for t ∈ {1 , . . . ,Th − 1}, the stock of shoppers evolves following:
sht+1 = (1 − δ)sht + δ.(Dh)
Equation (Dh) implies that the number of shoppers keeps increasing so long as the economy
stays in the high-price regime. In the limit, if the high price prevailed forever, the number of
shoppers would approach 1—all sensible shoppers would eventually go barefoot, unable (or
unwilling) to afford shoes, while fashionistas would continue shopping every period.
In the low-price regime, for t ∈ {1 , . . . ,T − 1}, the dynamic behavior of the economy is
simply characterized by
st+1 = λ + (1 − λ)δ.(D)
The number of shoppers stays constant (after one period) in the low-price regime. As always,
all fashionistas shop in every period, whereas sensible shoppers are now willing to buy the first
pair of shoes they sample—and they sample one with certainty in their first period of shopping.
Therefore, in this regime, the number of shoppers each period is made up of the λ fashionistas,
who shop no matter what, and the fraction δ of the 1 − λ sensible shoppers whose shoes just
wore out.
The steady-state values of sh and s were already given in Equations (13) and (15).
4.2.2. Switching points. The dynamic systems (Dh) and (D) only apply in the “interior”
of each regime, i.e., when the economy is not about to switch from one regime to the other. At
switching points—i.e., at t = Th in the high-price regime and t = T in the low-price regime—
the law of motion (12) implies the following. At a switch from the high-price into the low-price
regime, one has
s1 = (1 − δ)shTh + δ,(Sh→)
and at a switch from the low- into the high-price regime
sh1 = λ + (1 − λ) δ.(S→h)
4.2.3. Candidate nonstationary equilibrium for given Th andT. In order to construct a can-
didate nonstationary equilibrium, we solve systems (Dh), (D), (Sh→), and (S→h) recursively
for the sequence of populations of shoppers st. This gives
s1 = 1 − (1 − δ)Th+1(1 − λ)
st ≡ λ + (1 − λ) δ for t ∈ {2, · · · ,T}
sh1 = λ + (1 − λ)δ
sht = 1 − (1 − δ)t(1 − λ) for t ∈ {2, · · · ,Th}.
Note that any candidate nonstationary equilibrium characterized by the set of equations above is
independent of the number of periods spent in the low-price regime, T. For given values of Th,
we have therefore constructed a family of candidate nonstationary equilibria, each member of
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which is characterized by a duration of the high-price regime,Th.We now turn to the consistency
requirements for these candidate equilibria to constitute valid equilibria of our model.
4.2.4. Consistency conditions. For the candidate equilibrium described earlier to be valid,
it is necessary that the following inequalities hold:
sT >
λ
r0
and shTh <
λ
r0
.(22)
Note that we only need to check these conditions at dates Th and T, respectively. Thanks to
the monotonicity properties of sht and s

t in the candidate periodic equilibrium, inequality (22)
ensures that sht < λ/r
0 holds for all t < Th when the market is in the high-price regime and that
st > λ/r
0 holds for all t < T when the market is in the low-price regime.
Substitution of the various expressions that characterize our candidate equilibrium into (22)
leads to conditions on the parameters that are slightly different depending on whether one
considers T = 1 or T ≥ 2. The difference is due to the fact that it takes two periods in the
low-price regime for the number of shoppers to reach its constant value of λ + (1 − λ)δ. For
T = 1, the consistency conditions can be rewritten as
1 − (1 − δ)Th(1 − λ) < λ
r0
< 1 − (1 − δ)Th+1(1 − λ).(23)
This latter condition coincides with (21) when Th = 1. In addition, condition (23) defines a
nonempty set of parameter values for Th = 2, 3 , . . . . Note that the minimum value of λ/r0
consistent with the periodic equilibrium that spends two periods in the high-price regime fol-
lowed by one period in the low-price regime, i.e., the (2, 1) equilibrium, equals the maximum
value of λ/r0 consistent with the (1, 1) equilibrium; the minimum value of λ/r0 consistent with
the (3, 1) equilibrium equals the maximum value of λ/r0 consistent with the (2, 1) equilibrium,
etc. Further, as Th → ∞, the minimum and maximum values of λ/r0 consistent with a (Th, 1)
equilibrium both converge to 1, i.e., the highest λ/r0 consistent with stationary price dispersion.
That is, the parameter ranges for the various (Th, 1) cycles are nonoverlapping, ordered, and
cover the entire interval of λ/r0’s for which stationary price dispersion equilibria exist. Figure 1
provides a diagrammatic rendition of that partition of the parameter space, also indicating the
nature of equilibrium in each region.
Finally, for a cyclical equilibrium with T > 1 to exist, the following inequalities must hold:
1 − (1 − δ)Th(1 − λ) < λ
r0
< 1 − (1 − δ)(1 − λ),(24)
which is clearly not possible with Th ≥ 1. There is a clear intuition for the nonexistence of
periodic equilibria with T > 1 in this simple model. As discussed before (see the discussion
after equation (D)), the size and composition of the shopper pool stay constant after one period
in the low-price regime. Therefore, if stores do not find it in their interest to switch back to the
high price after just one period of sales, they never will—and in that case, the economy stays
in the low-price stationary equilibrium described in Section 3. In other words, if stores are ever
to switch back to the high price (as they are by definition in a periodic equilibrium), then they
want to do so after just one period in the low-price regime.
To summarize, we find that nonstationary equilibria with periodic cycles in which stores
charge the high price for some number of periods followed by the low price for one period
exist. These equilibria characterize periodic synchronized sales. We thus find that periodic
synchronized sales result from search behavior in a market in which consumers differ in terms
of their willingness to pay for a single unit of the good and in terms of their desire to switch to the
latest style. After several periods of high prices, the pool of searching consumers accumulates
a large enough fraction of the sensible shoppers that a sale is optimal for all the stores. This
pattern prevails in a market with search frictions despite the absence of market power.
4.2.5. Example. Consider again the case of β = 0.988 with λ = δ = 0.5, and recall that the
stationary equilibrium exhibits price dispersion for 0.253 < v < 0.337. The equilibrium with
Th = 1 and T = 1 exists for 0.289< v < 0.337, the (2, 1) equilibrium exists for 0.270< v < 0.289,
the (3, 1) equilibrium exists for 0.261 < v < 0.270, etc. Skipping ahead, the (10, 1) equilibrium
exists for 0.25306 < v < 0.25313, and the range of v for which the (100, 1) equilibrium exists
essentially collapses to the point v = 0.253. Periodic equilibria exist, however, for arbitrarily
large Th.9
4.3. Stability. We have established the coexistence of two long-run equilibria whenever
condition (19) holds: one stationary equilibriumwithprice dispersion, described inSection 3, and
one nonstationary equilibrium with synchronized sales but no within-period price dispersion,
described in this Section 4. We now prove that the latter is globally dynamically stable, whereas
the former is dynamically unstable.
Establishing global stability of the periodic equilibrium with sales is straightforward in this
simple model. As is clear from Equation (D), the number of shoppers, which is the state
variable, is reset to the value st = λ + (1 − λ)δ as soon as the economy hits the low-price
regime. For that reason the value st = λ + (1 − λ)δ is always a point of support for any periodic
equilibrium with synchronized sales, i.e., it is the point reached by the economy immediately
after the sales period. This establishes that the economy has reached the periodic long-run
equilibrium with synchronized sales as soon as it enters the low-price regime, which it is bound
to do after a finite number of periods if condition (19) holds. Formally, suppose the economy is
initially in the high-price regime at t = 0, i.e., s0 < λ/r0. Then st starts increasing following the
law of motion (Dh), until it surpasses the regime-switching threshold λ/r0, which it does in finite
time because, from (19), λ/r0 < 1, whereas the stable steady state associated with (Dh) is s∗h = 1.
Stability of the periodic equilibrium is illustrated in Figure 2. Starting from some initial value
s0 < λ/r0, the stock of shoppers st grows along the high-price regime dynamics, as depicted by
the plain solid “stairs” in Figure 2. After a few periods (three, in the case depicted in the figure),
st crosses the λ/r0 threshold and enters the low-price regime, implying that the stock of shoppers
gets reset to st+1 = λ + δ(1 − λ) < λ/r0, at which point the economy is locked into the periodic
equilibrium with synchronized sales, shown in the figure by the solid lines with arrows.
9 Again, there is nothing special about this example in the sense that given (β, δ, λ), there is always a range of v’s
that are consistent with periodic equilibrium. The v’s that are consistent with periodic equilibria are, of course, exactly
the same as those that are consistent with stationary equilibrium price dispersion. Thus, if the reader has a particular
view about the market for shoes, that is, about β (how frequently are sellers able to changes their prices?), δ (how long
on average do shoes last before a sensible shopper needs to buy another pair?), and λ (what fraction of the market do
fashionistas represent?), it is straightforward to compute the range of v’s that are consistent with synchronized sales.
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Finally, note that the same reasoning that served to establish global stability of the periodic
equilibrium also implies dynamic instability of the stationary equilibrium with price dispersion.
That is, if the stationary price dispersion equilibrium is disturbed even slightly, the market will
move into the periodic nonstationary equilibrium.
5. ROBUSTNESS
In order to present our results as cleanly as possible, we have made several simplifying
assumptions. In particular, we assumed that shoppers always find a pair of shoes (α = 1). In this
section, we relax this assumption and consider the case of α < 1.10 This complicates the model
somewhat, but we still find equilibria that can be interpreted as synchronized sales, i.e., several
periods in the high-price regime followed by one period in the low-price regime. We also find
10 In order to preserve the one-dimensional nature of our model (whose only state variable is the stock of shoppers
st), we maintain the normalization that the rate at which the fashionistas’ shoes go out of style is δ1 = 1. Footnote 6
explains the technical content of that normalization. As explained before, that normalization can be justified by thinking
of a period as the time it takes for the fashionistas’ shoes to become unfashionable. As such, the generalization we
propose in this section is one that says that it takes more time for a fashionista to find a pair of shoes that she likes than
it does for her to lose interest in that pair of shoes.
cyclical equilibria with richer dynamics, e.g., two periods in the high-price regime followed by
one period in the low-price regime followed by three periods in the high-price regime then one
period in the low-price regime and then repeating this pattern. Finally, we find some cyclical
equilibria with one period in the high-price regime and several periods in the low-price regime.
5.1. The Model with α < 1.
5.1.1. Values and prices. Compared to the α= 1 case analyzed earlier, the lower probability
α < 1 of finding an acceptable pair of shoes only affects the values of shoppers. The fashionistas’
and sensible shoppers’ values of wearing shoes, W1t and W
0
t , are still defined by (5) and (1),
respectively. The values of shopping, on the other hand, must be amended to account for the
possibility of staying in the pool of shoppers for more than one period. Specifically, for sensible
shoppers:
S0t = (1 − α)βS0t+1 + α
{
γtβS0t+1 + (1 − γt)
(
W0t − r0t
)}
= βS0t+1,
(25)
where the second equality uses the definition of the sensible shoppers’ reservation price,W0t −
r0t = βS0t+1. Equation (25) is essentially the same as Equation (2) with the added possibility (with
probability 1 − α) of not finding a suitable pair of shoes and thus continuing shopping for at
least one more period. The solution to (25) is S0t ≡ 0 and r0t ≡ r0 = v/[1 − β(1 − δ)], as in the
α = 1 case.
Turning to the fashionistas, their value of shopping is given by
S1t = (1 − α)βS1t+1 + α
{
γt
(
W1t − r1t
)+ (1 − γt)(W1t − r0)}
= βS1t+1 + α(1 − γt)
(
r1t − r0
)
.
(26)
Their reservation price is directly obtained from (5) and the definition of r1t : W
1
t − r1t = βS1t+1.
Combining those two equations immediately yields r1t ≡ r1 = 1, again the same as in the α = 1
case.
5.1.2. Consumer stocks. Following the steps we took in Section 2, we now derive the law
of motion of st, the total stock of shoppers, and stϕt, the stock of fashionistas among shoppers.
As in the α = 1 case, the latter is very simple: Because all fashionistas’ shoes go out of style with
certainty after one period (δ1 = 1), all of the fashionistas shop in every period, so that stϕt ≡ λ.
The total stock of shoppers then evolves following:
st+1 = st{1 − αϕt − α(1 − ϕt)(1 − γt)} + {λ − st(1 − α)ϕt} + δ{1 − λ − st(1 − ϕt)(1 − α + αγt)}
= st(1 − α + αγt)(1 − δ) − αλγt(1 − δ) + αλ + (1 − αλ)δ,(27)
where the second equality uses stϕt ≡ λ. This law of motion is interpreted as follows. The stock
of shoppers at the beginning of period t + 1 is the sum of three terms (in curly brackets). The
first term is the stock of shoppers who were present last period, less the αstϕt fashionistas among
them who found a suitable pair of shoes, less the αst(1 − ϕt)(1 − γt) sensible shoppers who
found a pair of shoes at a low price (the high price being unacceptable to sensible shoppers).
The second term reflects the inflow of fashionistas who had shoes in period t and all of whom
returned to shopping in period t + 1: Those are all the λ fashionistas in the population, minus
the (1 − α)stϕt who were already shopping in period t but failed to find shoes. Similarly, the
last term in curly brackets reflects the inflow of sensible shoppers who had shoes in period t but
whose shoes just wore out (which occurs with probability δ).
5.1.3. Stationary equilibria. The revenue obtained from posting any given price is still
proportional to the price times the probability that a customer met at random will accept that
price: It is simply scaled down to account for the lower probability of any given customer visiting
the store. This scaling down does not affect the comparison between the revenue from posting
the high price and that from posting the low price, implying that the stores’ decisions about
what price to post are still governed by the same rule as in the α = 1 case, i.e., decision rule (11).
Given this, it is straightforward to show that, just as in the α = 1 case, the model has a unique
stationary equilibrium, which can take one of three forms depending on parameter values. The
first type of stationary equilibrium is the one in which all firms post the high price (γ = 1) and
the stock of shoppers is s∗h = 1. This stationary equilibrium is consistent with the stores’ decision
rule (11) if and only if s∗h = 1 < λ/r0. In the second type of stationary equilibrium, all firms
post the low price (γ = 0), which implies s∗ = δ+αλ(1−δ)α+δ(1−α) . Application of (11) shows that this type
of equilibrium obtains if s∗ = δ+αλ(1−λ)α+δ(1−α) > λ/r0. Finally, the third type of equilibrium features
price dispersion. The stock of shoppers and the fraction of stores posting the high price (0 <
γ∗ < 1) are jointly determined by the steady-state version of the law of motion of st (27) and
the stores’ indifference condition from (11):
s∗γ =
αλ + δ(1 − αλ) − αγλ(1 − δ)
α + δ(1 − α) − αγ(1 − δ) , with
λ(1 − β(1 − δ))
v
= s∗γ.
This pair of equations defines a unique value γ	 ∈ (0, 1) if and only if
δ + αλ(1 − δ)
α + δ(1 − α) <
λ
r0
< 1.(28)
The conditions for any one type of equilibrium to prevail generalize conditions (14), (16), and
(19) found in the α = 1 case and, as before, these conditions partition the parameter space, so
that the model still has a unique stationary equilibrium for any set of parameter values.
5.2. Nonstationary Equilibria. Because the stores’ choices of which price to post are still
governed by (11), the indifference condition st = λ/r0 must hold for there to be price dispersion
within any given period. If the indifference condition does not hold, either all stores post the
high price (γt = 1), or they all post the low price (γt = 0). Then, (27) yields the following law of
motion for the stock of shoppers:
st+1 = F (st) :=
⎧⎪⎨
⎪⎩
st(1 − δ) + δ if st < λr0
st(1 − α)(1 − δ) + δ + αλ(1 − δ) if st > λr0 .
(29)
5.2.1. Existence, uniqueness, and stability. If parameters are such that a high-price station-
ary equilibrium exists—that is, if λ/r0 > 1—then, as can be readily seen from the stable dynamics
governed by the top equation in (29), and as was already the case with α = 1, the model’s unique
stationary equilibrium is globally stable and no stable nonstationary equilibrium can coexist
with it. The same applies, mutatis mutandis, to the case in which a low-price stationary equi-
librium exists, i.e., when λr0 <
δ+αλ(1−δ)
α+δ(1−α) . Since we are interested in nonstationary equilibria, we
exclude these cases from the subsequent analysis and assume that (28) holds. We now have the
following result:
PROPOSITION 1. Suppose inequalities (28) hold. Then the model has a unique, globally stable
equilibrium, which is periodic.
The proof is in Appendix A.1 and follows directly from the analysis of piecewise continuous
difference equations in Keener (1980).11
Proposition 1 guarantees several things. First, it guarantees existence and uniqueness of a
nonstationary equilibrium. Second, it ensures that the equilibrium is periodic (as opposed to
chaotic), arguably a desirable property for a theory of periodic sales. Beyond that, however,
there is nothing in Proposition 1 to help us characterize the actual dynamic behavior of our
economy. Even though we now know that the equilibrium is periodic, its periodicity may be
very large and its dynamic behavior may look much more complex than that of a market with
sales held at regular intervals. To gauge whether our model still offers a descriptively appealing
theory of synchronized sales, we need to further characterize these periodic equilibria. We do
so, at least partially, in the next paragraph.
5.2.2. Further equilibrium characterization. In the α = 1 case, we established that the
economy never stays in the low-price regime for two consecutive periods.12 In other words,
low-price spells are at most one period long and therefore look like sales. We now establish a
parallel, if slightly more complex, equilibrium property that holds in the more general case α ≤
1.
PROPOSITION 2. Suppose (28) holds, so that there exists a unique periodic equilibrium.
1. If δ+αλ(1−δ)+δ(1−αλ)(1−δ)
α+δ(1−α)+δ(1−α)(1−δ) ≤ λr0 ≤ 1, then the economy never spends two consecutive periods
in the low-price regime and periodically spends two or more consecutive periods in the
high-price regime.
2. If δ+αλ(1−δ)+δ(1−α)(1−δ)
α+δ(1−α)+δ(1−α)(1−δ) <
λ
r0 <
δ+αλ(1−δ)+δ(1−αλ)(1−δ)
α+δ(1−α)+δ(1−α)(1−δ) , then the economy oscillates between
one period in the high-price regime and one period in the low-price regime.
3. If δ+αλ(1−δ)
α+δ(1−α) ≤ λr0 ≤ δ+αλ(1−δ)+δ(1−α)(1−δ)α+δ(1−α)+δ(1−α)(1−δ) , then the economy never spends two consecutive
periods in the high-price regime and periodically spends two or more consecutive periods
in the low-price regime.
The proof is in Appendix A.2 The three cases covered in the statement of Proposition 2
partition the set of parameter values for which (28) holds, i.e., the set of parameter values for
which there exists a unique periodic equilibrium.
Case 1 in Proposition 2 can be described as the “synchronized sales” case. Although the
periodic equilibrium pattern can be fairly rich (as will be illustrated in simulations below), spells
of low prices never last more than one period in that parameter configuration, whereas spells
of high prices tend to last longer. Case 2 is the limiting “Th = 1, T = 1” case, analogous to the
first example analyzed at the beginning of Section 4. Case 3 is in a sense the opposite of Case 1
and is more difficult to interpret. In this case, high prices are the exception instead of the rule:
Equilibrium prices are low most of the time, with occasional one-period spells of high prices.
Further note that, while Cases 1 and 2 both persist as possible equilibrium configurations as
α → 1,13 the set of parameter values under which Case 3 arises collapses as α → 1.
5.2.3. Simulations. To illustrate some of the patterns that can occur in the market with
α < 1, we now present a set of simulations. We think of a period as one month. Fashionistas
go shopping every month. We assume that sensible shoppers need a new pair of shoes every
year on average, so that δ = 1/12. We set α = 0.5 (it takes a shopper two months on average to
find a suitable pair of shoes), and λ = 0.5 (the population is evenly divided into fashionistas and
11 We thank Leo Kaas for this reference.
12 Except of course if it stays there forever, i.e., if the only long-run equilibrium is the stationary low-price equilibrium.
See Sections 3 and 4.
13 Although, as established in Section 4, the set of possible patterns under case 1 becomes less rich as
α → 1 —; see below for simulations.
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sensible shoppers). We let r0 take different values within the bounds that are consistent with
periodic equilibria, which are given by condition (28). In this case the condition imposes r0 ∈
[0.5, 0.8667]. Figures 3 to 7 show examples of simulated time paths of the number of shoppers,
st. In all simulations the economy starts with a number of shoppers s0 = 0.46, except for Figure 7,
where for aesthetic reasons the starting value was set to s0 = 0.68. All simulations run for 48
periods.
Figure 3 is an example that resembles the α = 1 case. The market converges to a (Th, 1)
price cycle, with Th = 5 (there is a sale every sixth month). The duration of a typical high-price
spell, Th, increases in similar examples as r0 gets closer to the lower bound of the set of values
consistent with periodic equilibria defined by (28).
Figure 4 shows a more complex pattern, where the economy converges to a cycle of three
periods of high prices, followed by one period of sales, followed by four periods of high prices,
followed by one period of sales, etc. Other examples of this type of cyclical pattern, which can
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be concisely described as a (Th, 1, Th + 1, 1) cycle, arise for different values of r0, with the value
of Th again increasing as r0 moves closer to the lower bound of (28).
To further illustrate the richness of the set of possible cyclical patterns, Figures 5 and 6 show
two intermediate examples of a (Th, 1, Th + 1, 1, Th + 1, 1) cycle (Figure 5), and a (Th, 1, Th,
1, Th + 1, 1) cycle (Figure 6), with Th = 3 in both instances.
Finally, Figure 7 shows an example of Case 3 in Proposition 2 in which the economy is
“normally” (i.e., in three periods out of four) in the low-price regime but experiences a period
of high prices every fourth period.14
As these simulations show, the model with α < 1 delivers the synchronized sales that we
found in our basic model with α = 1 as well as a variety of other, more complex cycles.
14 While Figure 7 shows an example of a simple (1, T) cycle, it is possible to obtain more complex patterns (e.g., a
(1, T, 1, T + 1) cycle) in simulations. Such examples are available on request.
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6. CONCLUDING REMARKS
In this article, we propose a new theory of synchronized sales. We do this by proving the
existence of nonstationary periodic equilibria in a model of product market search. We show
that these periodic equilibria coexist with the stationary equilibria of the model that exhibit
price dispersion. More precisely, consider any parameter configuration that leads to a sta-
tionary equilibrium in which a fraction γ ∈ (0, 1) of the sellers post a price that only the
high-demand consumers accept while the other sellers post a lower price that both consumer
types accept. Then there is a corresponding nonstationary equilibrium in which the following
pattern repeats—all sellers post a high price for Th periods and then post a low price for one
period. Equilibria of this (Th, 1) type exist forTh = 1, 2, 3, . . ., and these equilibria are ordered in
the sense that the higher is Th, the higher is the value of γ in the corresponding stationary equi-
librium. Finally, these periodic equilibria, which are new to the search literature, are globally
dynamically stable, whereas the corresponding stationary dispersion equilibria are dynamically
unstable.
An equilibrium in which all sellers post a high price for several periods and then post a low
price for one period before returning to the high-price regime is exactly what one means by
“synchronized sales,” and, depending on parameters, our theory can generate sales at arbitrary
frequencies. These sales are driven by self-generating changes in the composition of consumer
types in the shopper pool and, in contrast to earlier models of sales with periodic cycles, these
sales arise in a model in which firms do not have market power.
APPENDIX
A.1. Proof of Proposition 1. The model’s dynamic behavior is governed by the piecewise
linear difference equation (29), which belongs to the class of difference equations analyzed by
Keener (1980). Following Keener’s notation, let a = lims↓λ/r0 F (s) = (1 − δ)λ[α + (1 − α)/r0] +
δ and b= lims↑λ/r0 F (s) = (1 − δ)λ/r0 + δ. The assumption that (28) holds immediately implies
that a < λ/r0 and b > λ/r0, so that F(a) = (1 − δ)a + δ > a and F(b) = (1 − α)(1 − δ)b + δ +
αλ(1 − δ) < b. Simple algebra further shows that F(a) = F(b) + αδ(1 − δ)(1 − λ) > F(b), which
establishes that the difference equation (29) satisfies properties F-I through F-IV in Keener
(1980). Moreover, wherever differentiable, F has a slope that is strictly less than 1.
The rest of this proof mainly consists of showing that the set of series of preimages of λ/r0
that lie in the interval (a, F(a)] (
 in Keener’s notation, see Definition 3.3 (b) in Keener, 1980),
is finite, so that Lemma 3.6 and Corollary 3.16 (b) apply and prove the proposition. To that
end, let us consider the following three cases, which cover the whole parameter space under
condition (28):
Case 1: F(a) > λ/r0 > F(b).
In this case, Lemma 3.2 in Keener (1980) applies and immediately proves the proposition.
Case 2: λ/r0 > F(a) > F(b).
In this case the interval (a, F(a)] lies entirely below λ/r0, so that preimages of λ/r0 greater
than λ/r0 cannot be in the set
 and we only need to focus on such preimages that are below
λ/r0. Now the relevant dynamic equation for values of s below λ/r0 is the top equation in
(29). Working that equation backward, preimages of λ/r0 all have the form 1 − (1 − λ/r0)/
(1 − δ)n, with n a positive integer. Clearly there can only be a finite number of such terms
within (a, F(a)], which proves that 
 is finite in this case.
Case 3: F(a) > F(b) > λ/r0.
In this case the interval (a, F(a)] straddles λ/r0, the point of discontinuity of F. However,
consider a potential preimageofλ/r0 (sayσ) in (a,λ/r0). Then, becauseF is strictly increasing
over (a, λ/r0), it follows that F(σ) > F(a), so that F (σ) ∈ (a,F (a)], implying that σ is not
in 
. We can thus focus on preimages that lie in (λ/r0, F(a)], an interval that is entirely
above λ/r0. The same reasoning as in Case 2 then applies, only now involving the bottom
equation in (29) instead of the top one. 
A.2. Proof of Proposition 2. The model’s dynamic behavior is governed by the piecewise
linear difference equation (29). Consider a date tc at which the economy crosses from the high-
price regime into the low-price regime, i.e., a date such that stc < λ/r
0 and stc+1 = F (stc) > λ/r0.
We now ask whether stc+2 = F 2(stc) is greater or smaller than λ/r0.
Because stc < λ/r
0, stc+1 = F (stc) > λ/r0, and F(·) is increasing within each regime, stc+2 =
F 2(stc) < F
2(λ/r0)−.15 Here, F2(λ/r0)− = (1 − δ)2(1 − α)λ/r0 + δ(1 − δ)(1 − α) + δ + αλ(1 − δ).
It is then straightforward to show that
F 2(λ/r0)− <
λ
r0
⇐⇒ λ
r0
>
δ + αλ(1 − δ) + δ(1 − α)(1 − δ)
α + δ(1 − α) + δ(1 − α)(1 − δ) .(A.1)
This establishes that, if inequality (A.1) holds, then the economy cannot spend two consecutive
periods in the low-price regime: Even if it crosses into the low-price regime “to the furthest
possible extent,” inequality (A.2) implies that it will revert to the high-price regime after one
period.
Conversely, suppose the economy crosses from the low-price regime into the high-price
regime at date tc, i.e., stc > λ/r
0 and stc+1 = F (stc) < λ/r0. We examine whether stc+2 = F 2(stc) is
greater or smaller than λ/r0. In this case, stc > λ/r
0 implies stc+2 = F 2(stc) > F 2(λ/r0)+.16 Here,
F2(λ/r0)+ = (1 − δ)2(1 − α)λ/r0 + δ(1 − δ) + δ + αλ(1 − δ)2. Then,
F 2(λ/r0)+ >
λ
r0
⇐⇒ λ
r0
<
δ + αλ(1 − δ) + δ(1 − αλ)(1 − δ)
α + δ(1 − α) + δ(1 − α)(1 − δ) ,(A.2)
which establishes that, if inequality (A.2) holds, the economy cannot spend two consecutive
periods in the high-price regime.
The proposition is then proven by noticing that Case 2 in the statement corresponds to
parameter combinations such that both inequalities (A.1) and (A.2) hold simultaneously, so
that the economy never spends more than one period in any regime, leaving the two-period
bang-bang equilibrium as the sole possibility. 
15 Where F (λ/r0)− := lims↑λ/r0 F (s).
16 Where F (λ/r0)+ := lims↓λ/r0 F (s).
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